The policy choices to watch.

1. End national public funding for social and affordable housing
2. Cut real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for social and affordable housing
7. Increase real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for social and affordable housing by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for social and affordable housing

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate
2. Set the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate at the dated baseline
7. Raise the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the federal household carbon fuel-charge rate at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No industrial carbon-price rates
2. Set industrial carbon-price rates below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set industrial carbon-price rates at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set industrial carbon-price rates at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set industrial carbon-price rates at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain industrial carbon-price rates at the dated baseline
7. Raise industrial carbon-price rates to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise industrial carbon-price rates to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise industrial carbon-price rates to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set industrial carbon-price rates at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new permanent-resident admissions
2. Reduce annual permanent-resident admissions by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual permanent-resident admissions by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual permanent-resident admissions by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual permanent-resident admissions by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual permanent-resident admissions
7. Increase annual permanent-resident admissions by 1–24%
8. Increase annual permanent-resident admissions by 25–49%
9. Increase annual permanent-resident admissions by 50–99%
10. At least double annual permanent-resident admissions

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new temporary-resident permits
2. Reduce annual new temporary-resident permits by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new temporary-resident permits by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new temporary-resident permits by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new temporary-resident permits by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new temporary-resident permits
7. Increase annual new temporary-resident permits by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new temporary-resident permits by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new temporary-resident permits by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new temporary-resident permits

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for Canada Health Transfer support
2. Cut real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support
7. Increase real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for Canada Health Transfer support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage
2. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to public prescription-drug coverage without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to public dental coverage
2. Entitlement to public dental coverage only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to public dental coverage for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to public dental coverage for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to public dental coverage for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to public dental coverage for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to public dental coverage for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to public dental coverage for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to public dental coverage for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to public dental coverage without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for regulated childcare
2. Cut real per-person funding for regulated childcare by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for regulated childcare
7. Increase real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for regulated childcare by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for regulated childcare

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all services in Indigenous communities
2. Local bodies advise on services in Indigenous communities; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to services in Indigenous communities; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed services in Indigenous communities
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed services in Indigenous communities
6. Central and local governments jointly set services in Indigenous communities
7. Local governments lead services in Indigenous communities within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set services in Indigenous communities, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set services in Indigenous communities, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of services in Indigenous communities without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new oil and gas project approvals
2. Reduce annual new oil and gas project approvals by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new oil and gas project approvals by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new oil and gas project approvals by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new oil and gas project approvals by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new oil and gas project approvals
7. Increase annual new oil and gas project approvals by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new oil and gas project approvals by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new oil and gas project approvals by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new oil and gas project approvals

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new interprovincial pipeline approvals
2. Reduce annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals
7. Increase annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new interprovincial pipeline approvals

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on interprovincial trade
2. Voluntary guidance for interprovincial trade
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for interprovincial trade
4. Registration requirements for interprovincial trade
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for interprovincial trade
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for interprovincial trade
7. Restrict interprovincial trade to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of interprovincial trade, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit interprovincial trade, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of interprovincial trade

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the top federal personal income-tax rate
2. Set the top federal personal income-tax rate below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the top federal personal income-tax rate at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the top federal personal income-tax rate at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the top federal personal income-tax rate at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the top federal personal income-tax rate at the dated baseline
7. Raise the top federal personal income-tax rate to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the top federal personal income-tax rate to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the top federal personal income-tax rate to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the top federal personal income-tax rate at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
2. Voluntary guidance for civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
4. Registration requirements for civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms
7. Restrict civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of civilian ownership of semi-automatic firearms

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 0%
2. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 10–24%
4. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 25–39%
5. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 40–49%
6. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 50–59%
7. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 60–74%
8. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 75–89%
9. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 90–99%
10. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all Quebec language policy
2. Local bodies advise on Quebec language policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to Quebec language policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed Quebec language policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed Quebec language policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set Quebec language policy
7. Local governments lead Quebec language policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set Quebec language policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set Quebec language policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of Quebec language policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility before age 55
2. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 55–57
3. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 58–59
4. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 60–61
5. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 62–63
6. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 64–65
7. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 66–67
8. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 68–69
9. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 70–71
10. Unreduced ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 72 or later

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on dairy, poultry and egg imports
2. Voluntary guidance for dairy, poultry and egg imports
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for dairy, poultry and egg imports
4. Registration requirements for dairy, poultry and egg imports
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for dairy, poultry and egg imports
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for dairy, poultry and egg imports
7. Restrict dairy, poultry and egg imports to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of dairy, poultry and egg imports, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit dairy, poultry and egg imports, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of dairy, poultry and egg imports

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.