The policy choices to watch.

1. No special legal restrictions on federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
2. Voluntary guidance for federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
4. Registration requirements for federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit
7. Restrict federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of federal borrowing beyond the ordinary debt-brake limit

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for transport and municipal infrastructure
2. Cut real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure
7. Increase real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for transport and municipal infrastructure

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for military assistance to Ukraine
2. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine
7. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
2. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
7. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
8. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
9. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–99%
10. At least double annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new refugee family-reunion admissions
2. Reduce annual refugee family-reunion admissions by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual refugee family-reunion admissions
7. Increase annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 1–24%
8. Increase annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 25–49%
9. Increase annual refugee family-reunion admissions by 50–99%
10. At least double annual refugee family-reunion admissions

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new naturalisation approvals
2. Reduce annual naturalisation approvals by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual naturalisation approvals by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual naturalisation approvals by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual naturalisation approvals by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual naturalisation approvals
7. Increase annual naturalisation approvals by 1–24%
8. Increase annual naturalisation approvals by 25–49%
9. Increase annual naturalisation approvals by 50–99%
10. At least double annual naturalisation approvals

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from coal: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for industrial decarbonisation
2. Cut real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation
7. Increase real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for industrial decarbonisation

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
2. Voluntary guidance for new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
4. Registration requirements for new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for new internal-combustion passenger-car sales
7. Restrict new internal-combustion passenger-car sales to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of new internal-combustion passenger-car sales, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit new internal-combustion passenger-car sales, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of new internal-combustion passenger-car sales

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the real statutory hourly minimum wage
2. Set the real statutory hourly minimum wage below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the real statutory hourly minimum wage at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the real statutory hourly minimum wage at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the real statutory hourly minimum wage at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the real statutory hourly minimum wage at the dated baseline
7. Raise the real statutory hourly minimum wage to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the real statutory hourly minimum wage to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the real statutory hourly minimum wage to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the real statutory hourly minimum wage at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for means-tested basic-income support
2. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support
7. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for means-tested basic-income support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility before age 55
2. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 55–57
3. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 58–59
4. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 60–61
5. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 62–63
6. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 64–65
7. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 66–67
8. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 68–69
9. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 70–71
10. Unreduced ordinary statutory-pension eligibility at age 72 or later

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for social housing construction and renewal
2. Cut real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal
7. Increase real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for social housing construction and renewal

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all implementation of European Union policy within the Länder
2. Local bodies advise on implementation of European Union policy within the Länder; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to implementation of European Union policy within the Länder; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed implementation of European Union policy within the Länder
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed implementation of European Union policy within the Länder
6. Central and local governments jointly set implementation of European Union policy within the Länder
7. Local governments lead implementation of European Union policy within the Länder within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set implementation of European Union policy within the Länder, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set implementation of European Union policy within the Länder, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of implementation of European Union policy within the Länder without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all school education policy
2. Local bodies advise on school education policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to school education policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed school education policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed school education policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set school education policy
7. Local governments lead school education policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set school education policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set school education policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of school education policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 0%
2. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 10–24%
4. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 25–39%
5. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 40–49%
6. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 50–59%
7. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 60–74%
8. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 75–89%
9. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 90–99%
10. Share of Bundestag seats allocated in proportion to party-list votes: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for digital public services and connectivity
2. Cut real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity
7. Increase real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for digital public services and connectivity

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.