The policy choices to watch.

1. End national public funding for public employment-guarantee programmes
2. Cut real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes
7. Increase real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for public employment-guarantee programmes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support
2. Cut real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support
7. Increase real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for manufacturing and industrial-development support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 0%
2. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 10–24%
4. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 25–39%
5. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 40–49%
6. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 50–59%
7. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 60–74%
8. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 75–89%
9. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 90–99%
10. Share of notified MSP crops with a legally enforceable minimum purchase-price guarantee: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for small-farmer income support
2. Cut real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for small-farmer income support
7. Increase real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for small-farmer income support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for small-farmer income support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 0%
2. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 10–24%
4. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 25–39%
5. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 40–49%
6. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 50–59%
7. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 60–74%
8. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 75–89%
9. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 90–99%
10. Share of census respondents included in a published caste-data collection: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 0%
2. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 10–24%
4. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 25–39%
5. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 40–49%
6. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 50–59%
7. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 60–74%
8. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 75–89%
9. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 90–99%
10. Share of public-sector recruitment posts covered by constitutionally permitted reservation: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
2. Voluntary guidance for religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
4. Registration requirements for religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules
7. Restrict religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of religion-specific marriage, divorce and inheritance rules

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
2. Voluntary guidance for religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
4. Registration requirements for religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria
7. Restrict religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of religion-based citizenship eligibility criteria

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all state domestic policy
2. Local bodies advise on state domestic policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to state domestic policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed state domestic policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed state domestic policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set state domestic policy
7. Local governments lead state domestic policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set state domestic policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set state domestic policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of state domestic policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 0%
2. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 10–24%
4. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 25–39%
5. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 40–49%
6. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 50–59%
7. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 60–74%
8. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 75–89%
9. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 90–99%
10. Share of Lok Sabha seats apportioned using the latest national population census: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 0%
2. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 10–24%
4. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 25–39%
5. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 40–49%
6. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 50–59%
7. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 60–74%
8. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 75–89%
9. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 90–99%
10. Share of directly elected legislative seats reserved for women: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all the timing of state legislative-assembly elections
2. Local bodies advise on the timing of state legislative-assembly elections; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to the timing of state legislative-assembly elections; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed the timing of state legislative-assembly elections
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed the timing of state legislative-assembly elections
6. Central and local governments jointly set the timing of state legislative-assembly elections
7. Local governments lead the timing of state legislative-assembly elections within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set the timing of state legislative-assembly elections, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set the timing of state legislative-assembly elections, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of the timing of state legislative-assembly elections without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy
2. Local bodies advise on Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy
7. Local governments lead Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of Jammu and Kashmir domestic policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare
2. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to publicly financed essential healthcare without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for school and higher education
2. Cut real per-person funding for school and higher education by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for school and higher education by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for school and higher education by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for school and higher education by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for school and higher education
7. Increase real per-person funding for school and higher education by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for school and higher education by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for school and higher education by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for school and higher education

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for household food-security support
2. Cut real per-person funding for household food-security support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for household food-security support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for household food-security support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for household food-security support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for household food-security support
7. Increase real per-person funding for household food-security support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for household food-security support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for household food-security support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for household food-security support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on new coal-fired electricity generation
2. Voluntary guidance for new coal-fired electricity generation
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for new coal-fired electricity generation
4. Registration requirements for new coal-fired electricity generation
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for new coal-fired electricity generation
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for new coal-fired electricity generation
7. Restrict new coal-fired electricity generation to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of new coal-fired electricity generation, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit new coal-fired electricity generation, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of new coal-fired electricity generation

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on government-ordered internet shutdowns
2. Voluntary guidance for government-ordered internet shutdowns
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for government-ordered internet shutdowns
4. Registration requirements for government-ordered internet shutdowns
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for government-ordered internet shutdowns
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for government-ordered internet shutdowns
7. Restrict government-ordered internet shutdowns to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of government-ordered internet shutdowns, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit government-ordered internet shutdowns, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of government-ordered internet shutdowns

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.