The policy choices to watch.

1. End national public funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale
2. Cut real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale
7. Increase real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility before age 55
2. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 55–57
3. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 58–59
4. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 60–61
5. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 62–63
6. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 64–65
7. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 66–67
8. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 68–69
9. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 70–71
10. Ordinary old-age pension eligibility at age 72 or later

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for means-tested household income support
2. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for means-tested household income support
7. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for means-tested household income support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for means-tested household income support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 0%
2. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 10–24%
4. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 25–39%
5. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 40–49%
6. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 50–59%
7. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 60–74%
8. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 75–89%
9. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 90–99%
10. Share of workers covered by collectively agreed wage floors: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the top national personal income-tax rate
2. Set the top national personal income-tax rate below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the top national personal income-tax rate at the dated baseline
7. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
2. Voluntary guidance for public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
4. Registration requirements for public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits
7. Restrict public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of public borrowing beyond ordinary national fiscal limits

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment
2. Cut real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment
7. Increase real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for National Recovery and Resilience Plan investment

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno
2. Cut real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno
7. Increase real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for infrastructure and public services in the Mezzogiorno

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new labour-migration permits
2. Reduce annual new labour-migration permits by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new labour-migration permits by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new labour-migration permits by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new labour-migration permits by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new labour-migration permits
7. Increase annual new labour-migration permits by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new labour-migration permits by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new labour-migration permits by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new labour-migration permits

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
2. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
7. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
8. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
9. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–99%
10. At least double annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on offshore asylum processing
2. Voluntary guidance for offshore asylum processing
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for offshore asylum processing
4. Registration requirements for offshore asylum processing
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for offshore asylum processing
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for offshore asylum processing
7. Restrict offshore asylum processing to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of offshore asylum processing, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit offshore asylum processing, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of offshore asylum processing

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new naturalisation and citizenship approvals
2. Reduce annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals
7. Increase annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 1–24%
8. Increase annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 25–49%
9. Increase annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals by 50–99%
10. At least double annual naturalisation and citizenship approvals

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 0%
2. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 10–24%
4. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 25–39%
5. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 40–49%
6. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 50–59%
7. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 60–74%
8. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 75–89%
9. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 90–99%
10. Share of ordinary prime-minister selection contests decided by direct popular vote: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all regional healthcare and public-service policy
2. Local bodies advise on regional healthcare and public-service policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to regional healthcare and public-service policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed regional healthcare and public-service policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed regional healthcare and public-service policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set regional healthcare and public-service policy
7. Local governments lead regional healthcare and public-service policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set regional healthcare and public-service policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set regional healthcare and public-service policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of regional healthcare and public-service policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to publicly funded legal aid
2. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to publicly funded legal aid for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to publicly funded legal aid without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to lawful abortion services
2. Entitlement to lawful abortion services only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to lawful abortion services for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to lawful abortion services without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for early-childhood care
2. Cut real per-person funding for early-childhood care by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for early-childhood care
7. Increase real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for early-childhood care by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for early-childhood care

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for military assistance to Ukraine
2. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine
7. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for military assistance to Ukraine

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.