The policy choices to watch.

1. No special legal restrictions on overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
2. Voluntary guidance for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
4. Registration requirements for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces
7. Restrict overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities
2. Cut real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities
7. Increase real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for US–Japan joint defence facilities

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from nuclear power: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 0%
2. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 10–24%
4. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 25–39%
5. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 40–49%
6. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 50–59%
7. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 60–74%
8. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 75–89%
9. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 90–99%
10. Share of domestic electricity generation from renewable sources: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the standard national consumption-tax rate
2. Set the standard national consumption-tax rate below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the standard national consumption-tax rate at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the standard national consumption-tax rate at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the standard national consumption-tax rate at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the standard national consumption-tax rate at the dated baseline
7. Raise the standard national consumption-tax rate to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the standard national consumption-tax rate to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the standard national consumption-tax rate to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the standard national consumption-tax rate at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the real statutory minimum-wage level
2. Set the real statutory minimum-wage level below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the real statutory minimum-wage level at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the real statutory minimum-wage level at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the real statutory minimum-wage level at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the real statutory minimum-wage level at the dated baseline
7. Raise the real statutory minimum-wage level to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the real statutory minimum-wage level to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the real statutory minimum-wage level to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the real statutory minimum-wage level at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for public social-insurance support
2. Cut real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for public social-insurance support
7. Increase real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for public social-insurance support by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for public social-insurance support

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Ordinary public-pension eligibility before age 55
2. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 55–57
3. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 58–59
4. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 60–61
5. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 62–63
6. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 64–65
7. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 66–67
8. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 68–69
9. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 70–71
10. Ordinary public-pension eligibility at age 72 or later

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for childcare and early-years services
2. Cut real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services
7. Increase real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for childcare and early-years services

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education
2. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to tuition-free post-secondary education without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new foreign-worker admissions
2. Reduce annual new foreign-worker admissions by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new foreign-worker admissions by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new foreign-worker admissions by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new foreign-worker admissions by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new foreign-worker admissions
7. Increase annual new foreign-worker admissions by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new foreign-worker admissions by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new foreign-worker admissions by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new foreign-worker admissions

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes
2. Reduce annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes
7. Increase annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
8. Increase annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
9. Increase annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes by 50–99%
10. At least double annual people admitted through refugee and humanitarian routes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on married couples retaining separate legal surnames
2. Voluntary guidance for married couples retaining separate legal surnames
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for married couples retaining separate legal surnames
4. Registration requirements for married couples retaining separate legal surnames
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for married couples retaining separate legal surnames
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for married couples retaining separate legal surnames
7. Restrict married couples retaining separate legal surnames to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of married couples retaining separate legal surnames, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit married couples retaining separate legal surnames, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of married couples retaining separate legal surnames

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on same-sex civil marriage
2. Voluntary guidance for same-sex civil marriage
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for same-sex civil marriage
4. Registration requirements for same-sex civil marriage
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for same-sex civil marriage
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for same-sex civil marriage
7. Restrict same-sex civil marriage to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of same-sex civil marriage, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit same-sex civil marriage, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of same-sex civil marriage

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 0%
2. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 10–24%
4. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 25–39%
5. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 40–49%
6. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 50–59%
7. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 60–74%
8. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 75–89%
9. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 90–99%
10. Share of parliamentary candidates required to be women: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on corporate and organisational political donations
2. Voluntary guidance for corporate and organisational political donations
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for corporate and organisational political donations
4. Registration requirements for corporate and organisational political donations
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for corporate and organisational political donations
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for corporate and organisational political donations
7. Restrict corporate and organisational political donations to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of corporate and organisational political donations, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit corporate and organisational political donations, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of corporate and organisational political donations

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on rice imports
2. Voluntary guidance for rice imports
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for rice imports
4. Registration requirements for rice imports
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for rice imports
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for rice imports
7. Restrict rice imports to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of rice imports, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit rice imports, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of rice imports

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all regional development policy
2. Local bodies advise on regional development policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to regional development policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed regional development policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed regional development policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set regional development policy
7. Local governments lead regional development policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set regional development policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set regional development policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of regional development policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on the use of capital punishment
2. Voluntary guidance for the use of capital punishment
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for the use of capital punishment
4. Registration requirements for the use of capital punishment
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for the use of capital punishment
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for the use of capital punishment
7. Restrict the use of capital punishment to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of the use of capital punishment, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit the use of capital punishment, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of the use of capital punishment

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.