The policy choices to watch.

1. End national public funding for the National Health Service
2. Cut real per-person funding for the National Health Service by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for the National Health Service
7. Increase real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for the National Health Service by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for the National Health Service

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No national legal entitlement to adult social care
2. Entitlement to adult social care only for a narrow emergency group
3. Entitlement to adult social care for the lowest-income tenth
4. Entitlement to adult social care for the lowest-income quarter
5. Entitlement to adult social care for the lowest-income half
6. Entitlement to adult social care for the lowest-income three quarters
7. Entitlement to adult social care for all low- and middle-income residents
8. Entitlement to adult social care for all residents with limited exclusions
9. Entitlement to adult social care for all residents, with modest copayments
10. Universal entitlement to adult social care without charges at the point of use

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for council and social housing
2. Cut real per-person funding for council and social housing by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for council and social housing by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for council and social housing by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for council and social housing by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for council and social housing
7. Increase real per-person funding for council and social housing by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for council and social housing by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for council and social housing by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for council and social housing

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new work and family visas
2. Reduce annual new work and family visas by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new work and family visas by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new work and family visas by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new work and family visas by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new work and family visas
7. Increase annual new work and family visas by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new work and family visas by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new work and family visas by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new work and family visas

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
2. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes
7. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 1–24%
8. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 25–49%
9. Increase annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes by 50–99%
10. At least double annual people admitted through asylum and humanitarian routes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No special legal restrictions on goods trade with the European Union
2. Voluntary guidance for goods trade with the European Union
3. Transparency and disclosure duties for goods trade with the European Union
4. Registration requirements for goods trade with the European Union
5. Licensing with a presumption of approval for goods trade with the European Union
6. Licensing with substantive eligibility tests for goods trade with the European Union
7. Restrict goods trade with the European Union to a limited set of approved cases
8. Presumptive prohibition of goods trade with the European Union, with broad exemptions
9. Prohibit goods trade with the European Union, with narrow exemptions
10. Complete prohibition of goods trade with the European Union

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 0%
2. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 10–24%
4. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 25–39%
5. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 40–49%
6. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 50–59%
7. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 60–74%
8. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 75–89%
9. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 90–99%
10. Share of European Court of Human Rights judgments accepted for domestic implementation: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Core defence spending below 0.5% of GDP
2. Core defence spending at 0.5–0.99% of GDP
3. Core defence spending at 1–1.49% of GDP
4. Core defence spending at 1.5–1.99% of GDP
5. Core defence spending at 2–2.49% of GDP
6. Core defence spending at 2.5–2.99% of GDP
7. Core defence spending at 3–3.49% of GDP
8. Core defence spending at 3.5–3.99% of GDP
9. Core defence spending at 4–4.99% of GDP
10. Core defence spending at 5% of GDP or more

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for decarbonisation programmes
2. Cut real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes
7. Increase real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for decarbonisation programmes

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Suspend new new North Sea oil and gas production licences
2. Reduce annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by at least 75%
3. Reduce annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 50–74%
4. Reduce annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 25–49%
5. Reduce annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 1–24%
6. Maintain annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences
7. Increase annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 1–24%
8. Increase annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 25–49%
9. Increase annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences by 50–99%
10. At least double annual new North Sea oil and gas production licences

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 0%
2. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 10–24%
4. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 25–39%
5. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 40–49%
6. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 50–59%
7. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 60–74%
8. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 75–89%
9. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 90–99%
10. Share of water-utility operating assets in public ownership: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 0%
2. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 10–24%
4. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 25–39%
5. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 40–49%
6. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 50–59%
7. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 60–74%
8. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 75–89%
9. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 90–99%
10. Share of passenger-rail operating services under public ownership: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 0%
2. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 10–24%
4. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 25–39%
5. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 40–49%
6. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 50–59%
7. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 60–74%
8. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 75–89%
9. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 90–99%
10. Share of workers covered by collective bargaining: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. No the top national personal income-tax rate
2. Set the top national personal income-tax rate below 25% of the dated baseline
3. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 25–49% of the dated baseline
4. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 50–74% of the dated baseline
5. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at 75–99% of the dated baseline
6. Maintain the top national personal income-tax rate at the dated baseline
7. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 101–124% of the dated baseline
8. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 125–149% of the dated baseline
9. Raise the top national personal income-tax rate to 150–199% of the dated baseline
10. Set the top national personal income-tax rate at twice the dated baseline or higher

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Ordinary State Pension eligibility before age 55
2. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 55–57
3. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 58–59
4. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 60–61
5. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 62–63
6. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 64–65
7. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 66–67
8. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 68–69
9. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 70–71
10. Ordinary State Pension eligibility at age 72 or later

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all devolved domestic policy
2. Local bodies advise on devolved domestic policy; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to devolved domestic policy; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed devolved domestic policy
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed devolved domestic policy
6. Central and local governments jointly set devolved domestic policy
7. Local governments lead devolved domestic policy within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set devolved domestic policy, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set devolved domestic policy, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of devolved domestic policy without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Central government decides all the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums
2. Local bodies advise on the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums; central government decides
3. Local bodies propose changes to the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums; central government approves each one
4. Local bodies administer centrally fixed the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums
5. Local bodies choose implementation of centrally fixed the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums
6. Central and local governments jointly set the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums
7. Local governments lead the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums within national minimum standards
8. Local governments set the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums, subject to judicial review
9. Local governments exclusively set the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums, with narrow national exceptions
10. Constitutionally protected local control of the timing and rules of Scottish independence referendums without ordinary national override

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 0%
2. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 10–24%
4. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 25–39%
5. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 40–49%
6. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 50–59%
7. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 60–74%
8. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 75–89%
9. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 90–99%
10. Share of House of Lords members chosen by popular election: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 0%
2. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: above 0% but below 10%
3. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 10–24%
4. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 25–39%
5. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 40–49%
6. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 50–59%
7. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 60–74%
8. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 75–89%
9. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 90–99%
10. Share of Commons seats allocated by proportional representation: 100%

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.

1. End national public funding for student-maintenance grants
2. Cut real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by at least 75%
3. Cut real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 50–74%
4. Cut real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 25–49%
5. Cut real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 1–24%
6. Maintain real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants
7. Increase real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 1–24%
8. Increase real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 25–49%
9. Increase real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants by 50–99%
10. At least double real per-person funding for student-maintenance grants

Editorial policy rubric, not a public-priority ranking. A higher number means more of the named policy dimension, not a better policy. Relative funding, tax and admissions changes require an explicitly dated baseline and comparison period in the placement evidence. Funding comparisons use inflation-adjusted per-person amounts. Proposals, enacted policy and outcomes must be distinguished; missing evidence stays unrated.