The Supreme Court heard a case on Monday, Nov. 2, that began when a Georgia prosecutor's office fired a top aide in 2019. Jasmine Younge says she was dismissed about two weeks after she told the district attorney she was pregnant. Lower courts never decided whether that was true. They ruled for the office on a defense it had not listed in its formal answer to her lawsuit.
The case is Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, No. 25-352. The question is about court procedure, but it reaches far beyond one workplace. It asks what happens when a defendant forgets to plead a defense and raises it later, at the summary judgment stage. The answer could affect thousands of civil cases, including many brought against state and local governments.
The argument followed Maxwell v. Dinis, a First Step Act case heard the same morning. The Justice Department also filed an emergency request over California mail ballots that day.
The question before the Court
The question presented starts with Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule says a party "must" plead "any" affirmative defense. An affirmative defense is a reason a defendant should win even if the plaintiff's account is true.
The Court agreed to decide two linked points. First, can a defendant that left a defense out of its answer still use it to win summary judgment, without amending or asking to amend the answer? Second, can it do so even when a scheduling rule, Rule 16(b)(4), would bar a late amendment? The Court granted review on March 30, 2026.
Summary judgment lets a judge decide a case without a trial when the key facts are not in dispute. Rule 15 governs changes to pleadings, and courts weigh factors such as "undue delay" in deciding whether to allow them. Rule 16 lets judges set deadlines. Once a deadline passes, a party needs "good cause" to change the schedule.
How the case began
A SCOTUSblog preview by Rodger Citron lays out the history. Younge held a high-level job in the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for about two months. District Attorney Paul Howard fired her in July 2019. She sued later that year. Among her claims was that firing her over her pregnancy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VII has an exemption that became the center of the case. The law's definition of "employee" leaves out members of an elected official's "personal staff" and "policymaking" appointees. If Younge fell into that group, Title VII would not cover her.
The DA's office did not raise that exemption in its answer. Discovery, the stage when each side gathers evidence, closed in January 2022 except for a few disputed matters. About two months later, at a hearing, the office said it would seek summary judgment based partly on the personal-staff exemption. According to the preview, the office said it learned of the defense only when its lawyer began drafting that motion. It never asked to amend its answer.
type: timeline
title: Key dates in Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office
source: [SCOTUSblog](https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/10/justices-to-decide-whether-failure-to-plead-an-affirmative-defense-prevents-moving-for-summary-j/), [Supreme Court question presented](https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/25-00352qp.pdf)
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July 2019: Younge is fired about two weeks after telling the district attorney she was pregnant
Later in 2019: Younge sues the DA's office, including a Title VII pregnancy claim
January 2022: Discovery closes, apart from a few disputed matters
March 2022: The office says it will seek summary judgment on the personal-staff exemption
2025: The 11th Circuit affirms judgment for the DA's office
March 30, 2026: The Supreme Court agrees to hear the case
Nov. 2, 2026: The justices hear argument
A federal magistrate judge allowed the defense and recommended judgment for the office. The district court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. It applied its 1988 decision in Hassan v. U.S. Postal Service. Under that precedent, a court may consider an unpleaded defense if the plaintiff was not "prejudiced," or harmed, by the delay. The appeals court found that the record contained "copious discovery evidence" on the exemption's factors and that Younge had not been prejudiced.
Younge's argument
Eric Schnapper of the University of Washington School of Law argued for Younge. "Pleading an affirmative defense is ordinarily a precondition for invoking that defense," he told the justices.
He said the 11th Circuit's approach "effectively rewrites Rules 8 and 12." He argued it lets a defendant skip Rule 16's good-cause standard "simply by moving for summary judgment." And he said it replaces the factors in Rules 15 and 16 with a "no-prejudice standard."
Younge's brief makes a text-based case. It notes that Rule 8(c)(1) uses "any" and Rule 12(b) uses "every." It says courts may not ignore the rules' plain words "in favor of a purpose-based standard of the court's own design." The brief also argues the 11th Circuit treats the two sides unequally. Plaintiffs who try to add new claims late, it says, are held to strict compliance with the same rules.
In rebuttal, Schnapper clarified his position. He said a defendant does not need a formal motion. A court "could treat a summary judgment motion as a motion to amend," he said. What matters, in his view, is that the court apply the standards of Rules 15 and 16.
The DA's office argument
Stephen J. Petrany of the law firm Jones Day argued for the DA's office. He said Younge "was undisputably personal staff to an elected official." He acknowledged the office "mistakenly failed to plead this defense in its answer." But he said the mistake and its consequences are "two separate issues."
Petrany pointed to Rule 61, the rules' harmless-error provision. He also noted that other rules spell out when a party loses an argument, such as Rule 12(h). Rule 8 does not. He told the justices the rules once said a defendant waived any defense left out of the answer, but that language "was removed in 1966."
The office's brief says the "correct outcome on the merits here is not up for debate." It describes Younge's position as a "hypertechnical" approach that the rules and the Court have "long since abandoned." The test, the brief says, is whether the plaintiff "could have done anything materially differently" if the defense had been in the answer.
Petrany called the office's prejudice test "tougher than Rule 15." Several justices questioned that claim.
The states and other friends of the Court
West Virginia Attorney General John McCuskey led a brief for 17 states supporting the DA's office. The signers include Georgia Attorney General Chris Carr and Oregon Attorney General Dan Rayfield. The brief says states are, apart from the federal government, the most frequent defendants in federal court. It warns that Younge's rule "would likely produce a steady stream of cases in which States will lose defenses that Congress gave them because of omissions that harmed no one." [Funding: campaign funding data not verified] [Funding: campaign funding data not verified]
The brief describes Younge's view of a defendant's answer as "a kind of tiger trap." It adds that the exemption at issue is itself a protection for state governments, as a matter of federalism.
The Washington Legal Foundation, a Washington-based legal advocacy group, filed in support of neither side. It asked the Court not to cast doubt on existing doctrines that let courts consider a forfeited defense in some cases. One example is "forfeiture of forfeiture," which applies when a plaintiff does not object to a late defense in time.
What the justices asked
Justice Clarence Thomas opened by asking Schnapper what prejudice Younge suffered. Schnapper said she would have sought more discovery. One topic was whether the public saw her as speaking for the district attorney. Another was how closely the chief of staff supervised her. Thomas said, "I thought it was admitted that she was a member of his personal staff." Schnapper replied that the question turned on a "six-part test" and was disputed. [Funding: campaign funding data not verified] [Funding: campaign funding data not verified]
Justice Samuel Alito asked whether "undue delay" under Rule 15 is closely tied to prejudice. "If nobody was prejudiced... then why would it be undue?" he asked. He suggested "we're talking about a sliver, a sliver of cases" where there is undue delay without prejudice.
Justice Neil Gorsuch said the difference between the sides seemed to come down to delay. "The rubber meets the road when it comes to undue delay, I think, right?" he asked. Schnapper agreed.
Justice Elena Kagan suggested that a forgotten defense is "never waived" in the strict sense, because the rules allow amendment. "I'm hard-pressed to find something in what you said that I disagree with," Schnapper replied. Justice Amy Coney Barrett responded, "Try anyway," which drew a further explanation.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor said she saw "three different approaches" among lower courts. She said the D.C. Circuit requires a defendant to first file a motion to amend. She asked whether Younge wanted that rule imposed nationwide. Schnapper said that, given his "druthers," he would not take a position on that rule because it was not at issue here.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh said the question of whether "good cause" is required "is critical here." That standard, under Rule 16, is harder to meet than Rule 15's.
With Petrany, Barrett asked whether the office would object if the Court simply treated its summary judgment motion as a motion to amend under Rule 15. She suggested the office's real concern was Rule 16. She asked whether its worry was that the good-cause standard "would essentially mean that nobody can ever amend because good cause is really hard."
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson pressed Petrany on incentives. If the prejudice test is harder than Rule 15, she asked, would defendants still move to amend? "But you didn't move to amend," she noted. Kagan observed that under Petrany's reading, Rule 16's good-cause question would never be reached.
The full argument transcript is posted on the Court's website. The argument ran from 11:12 a.m. to 12:08 p.m.
Why the case matters
For workers who sue employers, the case is about notice. Younge's side argues that a plaintiff plans discovery around the defenses in the answer. A defense that appears late may leave her without evidence she would have sought.
For governments and businesses that get sued, the case is about mistakes. The states argue that lawyers drafting answers on short deadlines will sometimes miss a defense. They say a strict rule would keep weak cases alive over omissions that did not change the outcome.
The ruling could also shape how much discretion trial judges keep. A decision for Younge would steer courts toward the factors in Rules 15 and 16. A decision for the DA's office would let courts focus on whether the delay actually hurt the plaintiff. In his preview, Citron predicted the Court is unlikely to find the 11th Circuit's prejudice standard out of bounds. The justices' questions on Monday probed both sides.
More on federal policy debates is in our United States issues guide. Georgia's statewide contests are covered on our Georgia governor race page. 567 Politics explains how it presents competing arguments in its methodology.
Pending steps
- A decision is expected by the end of the Court's term, usually late June or early July.
- If Younge wins, the case would likely return to the lower courts to apply Rules 15 and 16. Her Title VII claim could then move forward or face the exemption again under a different standard.
- If the DA's office wins, the judgment against Younge would stand.
This article was produced with AI assistance and reviewed against 567 Politics editorial standards. It is based on the Nov. 2 argument transcript, the question presented, the parties' merits briefs, two amicus briefs and the SCOTUSblog preview, as available on the afternoon of Nov. 2. The 11th Circuit's opinion and the district court record were not opened directly; they are described through the briefs and the preview. Campaign finance data is not included because this story is about a procedural case. The state attorneys general named here report campaign money to their states, not the FEC, and 567 Politics has no verified federal funding snapshot for Carr. The case does not involve a campaign.