French deputies scrap a ban on encryption backdoors, 69–37, trading it for a nonbinding government promise

France's National Assembly on Tuesday deleted a Senate-written article that would have barred the state from forcing encrypted messaging services such as Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram to build in "backdoors" for investigators. The vote was 69 to 37, with one abstention, according to the Assembly's official record of public vote No. 9794. The government had asked for the deletion, arguing that the article was written so broadly that it would block wiretaps, phone geolocation and other surveillance tools already allowed by law.

In return, ministers gave a political promise rather than a legal one. Digital Affairs Minister Anne Le Hénanff pledged that the government would not bring back a measure weakening encryption "d'ici la fin de la session parlementaire" (before the end of the parliamentary session), while Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez spoke of a commitment lasting until "la fin de l'actuelle mandature" (the end of the current term), Numerama reported. Neither pledge has legal force, the outlet noted.

The deleted provision, known as Article 16 bis, sat in a bill on the resilience of critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The bill's main purpose is to bring European Union cybersecurity rules into French law. Its fate matters well beyond messaging apps, because France is already late in applying those rules.

What the Assembly removed#

Article 16 bis was a single sentence. It said that encryption service providers, including qualified trust service providers, could not be required to integrate "technical devices intended to deliberately weaken the security of information systems and electronic communications, such as master decryption keys or any other mechanism or process allowing non-consensual access to protected data." That wording is quoted in full in the government's deletion amendment, No. 358, filed on Oct. 3.

The removal does not create any new duty for platforms to hand over messages, and it does not authorize a master key. PolitiqueMatin noted that the vote only takes out an explicit ban that would have appeared in this one bill. The rules on judicial interceptions, data retention and encryption stay as they were before the vote.

The left groups that opposed the deletion said that difference mattered less than it looked. Without a written ban, they argued, a future government could again try to impose access to encrypted conversations, as senators tried to do in 2025.

How the groups voted#

The deletion passed with votes from the National Rally, the parties of the governing center, the Republican Right, the LIOT group and most Socialists who took part. La France insoumise and the Ecologist group voted against, joined by one deputy from Ensemble pour la République. Only 107 of the 577 deputies voted.

• For deletion
• Against deletion

Rassemblement national

17

Ensemble pour la République

18

La France insoumise

26

Les Démocrates

9

Droite républicaine

8

Horizons

8

Écologiste et social

10

Socialistes

5

LIOT

3

Non-inscrits

2

Source: Assemblée nationale, public vote No. 9794

Show the numbers

Group	For deletion	Against deletion
Rassemblement national	17	0
Ensemble pour la République	17	1
La France insoumise	0	26
Les Démocrates	9	0
Droite républicaine	8	0
Horizons	8	0
Écologiste et social	0	10
Socialistes	5	0
LIOT	3	0
Non-inscrits	2	0

The split did not follow the usual left-right line. The National Rally voted with the government's allies, while the Socialists, who are in opposition, also backed the deletion. The two left groups that most often clash with the government cast all but one of the votes against. The France political spectrum chart shows where each of these parties sits on economic and social questions.

The chart's positions are dated editorial estimates of each party's overall stance. They do not measure views on encryption, which cut across those positions in Tuesday's vote.

The government's case: a ban that reached too far#

Nuñez told deputies that the article "est écrit de manière trop large" (is written too broadly), LCP-Assemblée nationale reported. He said it would rule out intelligence techniques "déjà autorisées par la loi" (already authorized by law), including "very basic" ones such as real-time geolocation and the collection of connection data. He added that it would also threaten special investigative techniques used in criminal cases.

The minister described the article as a reaction to a measure that no longer exists. "C'était un anti-8ter, mais il n'y a plus de 8ter, donc il n'y a plus forcément de raison d'avoir un 16bis" (It was an anti-8 ter, but there is no more 8 ter, so there is no longer necessarily a reason to have a 16 bis), he said, according to an AFP report carried by Notre Temps.

The government's written amendment set out its argument at length. It said the key problem was the phrase banning any "mechanism or process allowing non-consensual access to protected data." Lawful interceptions, by their nature, involve access to data without the target's consent, the amendment argued. A ban on such mechanisms would therefore make "de facto inapplicable" the tools that police and intelligence services use, from interception of calls and messages to geolocation and the remote capture of computer data.

The amendment also gave figures for October 2026 alone, covering only judicial investigations. It said there were more than 51,000 phone geolocation measures, more than 4 million requests for connection data and 50,000 phone lines under judicial interception. The government said those tools require prior approval by an investigating judge or a liberty and detention judge, or, for intelligence work, by the prime minister after an opinion from the independent oversight body CNCTR.

The amendment warned that the article could free ordinary phone operators from their duty to cooperate with judges, and could make France a kind of "Eldorado" for European criminal groups. It also called the article a "cavalier," a legal term for a provision with no real link to the bill it sits in. That matters in France because the Constitutional Council can strike out such riders.

Supporters inside the chamber made similar points. "Il nous faut bien évidemment supprimer cette disposition qui mettrait demain en difficulté nos services enquêteurs" (We obviously must delete this provision, which would tomorrow put our investigators in difficulty), said Éric Bothorel of Ensemble pour la République, the bill's general rapporteur, according to LCP. Vincent Thiébaut of Horizons, a co-rapporteur, said that keeping the article as written would give "une longueur d'avance aux pédocriminels, aux narcotrafiquants" (a head start to child sex offenders and drug traffickers), AFP reported.

Émeric Salmon of the National Rally said the article's wording created uncertainty over investigative and intelligence techniques now in use. Philippe Latombe of Les Démocrates added that rejecting the article did not mean backdoors would now be allowed.

The opponents' case: encryption as a condition of security#

Deputies from La France insoumise and the Ecologists argued that the deletion weakened a protection for every user. "Inscrire une faille structurelle dans nos systèmes, c'est offrir une entrée accessible aux cyberattaquants" (Writing a structural flaw into our systems means offering an open door to cyberattackers), said René Pilato of La France insoumise, according to LCP.

"Le chiffrement n'est pas un obstacle à la sécurité, il en est l'une des conditions essentielles" (Encryption is not an obstacle to security; it is one of its essential conditions), said Ecologist deputy Catherine Hervieu. AFP reported that she went further and called for "constitutional recognition of the right to encryption." She also said that "fundamental freedoms must not depend on successive changes in security policy."

Their case echoes the reasoning that senators gave when they wrote the article. The Senate amendment that created it, led by Olivier Cadic, said that any deliberate weakness in an encryption system could be exploited "not only by the intended authorities" but also by cybercriminals, hostile states and private actors. It said such access would conflict with the right to privacy under the EU's data protection rules and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It also argued that weakening French and European encryption tools would push users toward foreign products seen as safer and so hurt France's digital sovereignty.

Not every supporter of the deletion was comfortable with it. Socialist deputy Ayda Hadizadeh said it was a pity that lawmakers had not managed to write a well-drafted article banning backdoors for good, LCP reported. Most of her group still voted for the deletion.

How the fight began#

Article 16 bis was born as a counterweight. In early 2025, senators added an article known as 8 ter to a bill against drug trafficking. It would have required encrypted messaging services to give investigators access to the conversations of people under surveillance. Then-Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau backed that measure, AFP reported. Messaging companies objected strongly, and the Assembly removed it from the final drug trafficking law.

Senators then approached the issue from the other side. In March 2025, at Cadic's initiative, they wrote a ban on such devices into the cybersecurity bill, against the government's advice. Cadic chaired the Senate's special committee on the text. The Assembly's own special committee approved the article in the autumn of 2025 and even widened it, LCP reported.

The interior ministry and the intelligence services opposed the article from the start. Mahamadou Diarra, the secretary general of the national intelligence and counterterrorism coordination office, told the Assembly's special committee in July 2025 that "l'article 16 bis n'a pas sa place dans le projet de loi" (Article 16 bis has no place in the bill), according to Numerama. After that, the bill stalled for months. LCP reported that several well-informed lawmakers blamed a blockage by the intelligence services, led by the domestic intelligence agency DGSI.

The way out came through a report. In January 2026, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu asked former deputy Florent Boudié to study encryption. His report, delivered in September, recommended giving up on backdoors but also deleting Article 16 bis, Numerama reported. The government then filed its deletion amendment and offered the no-reintroduction pledge as its side of the deal.

1. Oct. 17, 2024Deadline for EU states to transpose the NIS 2 cybersecurity directive passes without French transposition
2. March 2025Senate adopts the Cadic amendment that becomes Article 16 bis
3. July 2025Intelligence coordinator Mahamadou Diarra tells deputies the article "has no place" in the bill
4. January 2026Lecornu asks Florent Boudié to study encryption
5. September 2026Boudié report recommends no backdoors and deleting Article 16 bis
6. Oct. 3, 2026Government files deletion amendment No. 358
7. Nov. 10, 2026Assembly deletes Article 16 bis by 69 votes to 37
8. Nov. 17, 2026Solemn vote on the whole bill scheduled

What the bill is meant to do#

The wider bill transposes the EU's NIS 2 directive, adopted in 2022. The directive requires sectors judged essential, such as energy, health and public administration, to strengthen their cybersecurity and to report serious incidents to authorities. In France it is expected to cover about 15,000 entities, compared with a few hundred under the first directive, Numerama reported.

The directive was supposed to be in national law by Oct. 17, 2024. The European Commission has taken France to the Court of Justice of the EU over the delay, according to Numerama. LCP noted that the bill comes two years after it was first presented, at a time when many state agencies have suffered large data leaks in recent months.

LCP reported that the dispute over Article 16 bis had stalled the bill for several months. The deal on the article is meant to clear the way for its adoption.

A Nov. 17 vote, a joint committee and a promise to watch#

Deputies were expected to finish debating the rest of the bill Tuesday evening, with a solemn vote on the whole text set for Tuesday, Nov. 17. The Assembly and Senate versions will then likely go to a joint committee of seven deputies and seven senators, which must agree on a single text, Numerama reported. Because senators wrote Article 16 bis, that committee is where any attempt to restore it would most likely surface.

Even after final adoption, the NIS 2 duties will not apply in France until the government issues the implementing decrees.

The pledge not to revive backdoor proposals will also be tested. Le Hénanff's promise runs to the end of the parliamentary session, while Nuñez's runs to the end of the current legislature. Lawmakers on both sides of Tuesday's vote will be watching for any new bill on access to encrypted messages, including in future security or drug trafficking legislation.

Encryption is one of several security debates now before French lawmakers. Nuñez also faces a parliamentary inquiry into the Oct. 17 riots, where he told deputies that the "lack of anticipation" was his own.

Sources were reviewed on Nov. 10, 2026. French quotations were translated by 567 Politics staff.

Differing perspectives

Should France's cybersecurity law explicitly bar the state from requiring encryption backdoors?

Each position is summarized as its supporters make it, with equal weight and in alphabetical order. A summary is not an endorsement; the evidence for each is weighed in the story above.

• Delete the explicit ban

  Who holds it: The government, including Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez and Digital Minister Anne Le Hénanff; the governing center, National Rally, Republican Right and most Socialist voters

  The government argues that the article's ban on any mechanism allowing non-consensual access to protected data would cover lawful interception itself. Wiretaps, geolocation and connection-data requests, already approved by judges or by the prime minister after independent review, would become unusable in cases from child abuse to drug trafficking. It says the article was also unrelated to the bill's purpose of applying EU cybersecurity rules, and that ministers have pledged not to bring back proposals for backdoors.

  In their words: Government of France, amendment No. 358 (Assemblée nationale) ↗

• Keep an explicit ban on backdoors

  Who holds it: Senator Olivier Cadic and the article's Senate co-sponsors; La France insoumise and Ecologist deputies

  Supporters argue that any deliberate weakness built into encryption can be exploited not only by authorities but also by cybercriminals, hostile states and private actors, so it lowers security for everyone. They say forced access would conflict with privacy rights under EU data protection rules and the European Convention on Human Rights. They add that weakening French and European encryption tools would push users toward foreign products and hurt digital sovereignty, and that a written ban is firmer than a political promise.

  In their words: Sénat, amendment No. 1 by Olivier Cadic and others ↗

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