What U.S. aid to Israel, Egypt and Jordan—and decades of war—have cost
Annual and cumulative charts in 2025 dollars track aid to Israel, Egypt and Jordan, Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria costs, and the partial 2026 Iran estimate.
Cumulative cost per taxpayer over time
The included aid and military costs accumulate to about $13,908 per taxpayer in 2025 dollars by the chart’s 2026 endpoint. Each point divides the inflation-adjusted cumulative subtotal by the same 216,559,400 taxpayers, the Pentagon report’s FY2024 reference count. This shows how costs build over time at a fixed population size; it is not the bill paid by each year’s taxpayers.
Source: Official annual country aid, Aid by funding agency, Pentagon annual military costs, Iran estimate reported by Stars and Stripes, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Year | Cumulative cost per taxpayer |
|---|---|
| 1951 | $0.01 |
| 1952 | $4.18 |
| 1953 | $8.13 |
| 1954 | $12.13 |
| 1955 | $17.67 |
| 1956 | $21.57 |
| 1957 | $24.17 |
| 1958 | $28.56 |
| 1959 | $34.73 |
| 1960 | $41.6 |
| 1961 | $48.93 |
| 1962 | $61.44 |
| 1963 | $71.98 |
| 1964 | $78.84 |
| 1965 | $86.44 |
| 1966 | $94.27 |
| 1967 | $97.2 |
| 1968 | $100.38 |
| 1969 | $105.04 |
| 1970 | $107.29 |
| 1971 | $126.59 |
| 1972 | $140.79 |
| 1973 | $154.81 |
| 1974 | $219.83 |
| 1975 | $246.84 |
| 1976 | $328.77 |
| 1977 | $383.88 |
| 1978 | $437.4 |
| 1979 | $564.14 |
| 1980 | $611.83 |
| 1981 | $666.38 |
| 1982 | $721.91 |
| 1983 | $783.19 |
| 1984 | $846.31 |
| 1985 | $916.67 |
| 1986 | $989.24 |
| 1987 | $1,050.04 |
| 1988 | $1,106.74 |
| 1989 | $1,161.97 |
| 1990 | $1,217.94 |
| 1991 | $1,277.02 |
| 1992 | $1,327.8 |
| 1993 | $1,378.4 |
| 1994 | $1,423.84 |
| 1995 | $1,471.52 |
| 1996 | $1,520 |
| 1997 | $1,567.24 |
| 1998 | $1,612.7 |
| 1999 | $1,659.58 |
| 2000 | $1,711.85 |
| 2001 | $1,753.66 |
| 2002 | $1,953.37 |
| 2003 | $2,432.29 |
| 2004 | $2,979.67 |
| 2005 | $3,627.41 |
| 2006 | $4,350.6 |
| 2007 | $5,343.2 |
| 2008 | $6,469.3 |
| 2009 | $7,420.45 |
| 2010 | $8,444.38 |
| 2011 | $9,399.29 |
| 2012 | $10,157.11 |
| 2013 | $10,699.58 |
| 2014 | $11,103.23 |
| 2015 | $11,464.82 |
| 2016 | $11,749.64 |
| 2017 | $12,070.5 |
| 2018 | $12,362.16 |
| 2019 | $12,685.41 |
| 2020 | $13,000.17 |
| 2021 | $13,260.65 |
| 2022 | $13,397.17 |
| 2023 | $13,540.43 |
| 2024 | $13,673 |
| 2025 | $13,696.74 |
| 2026 | $13,908.03 |
Cumulative total: aid and selected military costs
The aggregate-dollar chart below combines the same included records year by year. Adding eligible annual aid and military-cost records produces a selected-cost subtotal of about $3.012 trillion in constant 2025 dollars. This includes aid to Israel, Egypt and Jordan recorded from 1951 through 2025; Pentagon Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria obligations through FY2024; and a separately dated Iran-war estimate through October 16, 2026.
Per taxpayer: the selected cumulative subtotal is approximately $13,908 in 2025 dollars, spread evenly over a fixed reference population of 216,559,400 taxpayers. Every chart now gives comparable per-taxpayer equivalents in its own stated dollar basis. This is an illustration of scale, not an estimate of anyone’s actual tax liability. Denominator: Pentagon’s FY2024 taxpayer count.
This is a partial accounting of obligations and estimated costs, not an audited cash-spending total or a complete bill for every war since 1951. The years indicate how the included amounts accumulate. A flat segment means no additional observation was added from these sources, not that the United States incurred no costs.
Source: Official annual country aid, Aid by funding agency, Pentagon annual military costs, Iran estimate reported by Stars and Stripes, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Year | Selected aid | Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria | Iran estimate | Combined selected costs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1951 | $0B | $0B | $0B | $0B |
| 1952 | $0.91B | $0B | $0B | $0.91B |
| 1953 | $1.76B | $0B | $0B | $1.76B |
| 1954 | $2.63B | $0B | $0B | $2.63B |
| 1955 | $3.83B | $0B | $0B | $3.83B |
| 1956 | $4.67B | $0B | $0B | $4.67B |
| 1957 | $5.24B | $0B | $0B | $5.24B |
| 1958 | $6.19B | $0B | $0B | $6.19B |
| 1959 | $7.52B | $0B | $0B | $7.52B |
| 1960 | $9.01B | $0B | $0B | $9.01B |
| 1961 | $10.6B | $0B | $0B | $10.6B |
| 1962 | $13.31B | $0B | $0B | $13.31B |
| 1963 | $15.59B | $0B | $0B | $15.59B |
| 1964 | $17.07B | $0B | $0B | $17.07B |
| 1965 | $18.72B | $0B | $0B | $18.72B |
| 1966 | $20.42B | $0B | $0B | $20.42B |
| 1967 | $21.05B | $0B | $0B | $21.05B |
| 1968 | $21.74B | $0B | $0B | $21.74B |
| 1969 | $22.75B | $0B | $0B | $22.75B |
| 1970 | $23.24B | $0B | $0B | $23.24B |
| 1971 | $27.42B | $0B | $0B | $27.42B |
| 1972 | $30.49B | $0B | $0B | $30.49B |
| 1973 | $33.53B | $0B | $0B | $33.53B |
| 1974 | $47.61B | $0B | $0B | $47.61B |
| 1975 | $53.46B | $0B | $0B | $53.46B |
| 1976 | $71.2B | $0B | $0B | $71.2B |
| 1977 | $83.13B | $0B | $0B | $83.13B |
| 1978 | $94.72B | $0B | $0B | $94.72B |
| 1979 | $122.17B | $0B | $0B | $122.17B |
| 1980 | $132.5B | $0B | $0B | $132.5B |
| 1981 | $144.31B | $0B | $0B | $144.31B |
| 1982 | $156.34B | $0B | $0B | $156.34B |
| 1983 | $169.61B | $0B | $0B | $169.61B |
| 1984 | $183.28B | $0B | $0B | $183.28B |
| 1985 | $198.51B | $0B | $0B | $198.51B |
| 1986 | $214.23B | $0B | $0B | $214.23B |
| 1987 | $227.4B | $0B | $0B | $227.4B |
| 1988 | $239.68B | $0B | $0B | $239.68B |
| 1989 | $251.64B | $0B | $0B | $251.64B |
| 1990 | $263.76B | $0B | $0B | $263.76B |
| 1991 | $276.55B | $0B | $0B | $276.55B |
| 1992 | $287.55B | $0B | $0B | $287.55B |
| 1993 | $298.51B | $0B | $0B | $298.51B |
| 1994 | $308.35B | $0B | $0B | $308.35B |
| 1995 | $318.67B | $0B | $0B | $318.67B |
| 1996 | $329.17B | $0B | $0B | $329.17B |
| 1997 | $339.4B | $0B | $0B | $339.4B |
| 1998 | $349.25B | $0B | $0B | $349.25B |
| 1999 | $359.4B | $0B | $0B | $359.4B |
| 2000 | $370.72B | $0B | $0B | $370.72B |
| 2001 | $378.97B | $0.8B | $0B | $379.77B |
| 2002 | $388.28B | $34.75B | $0B | $423.02B |
| 2003 | $400.56B | $126.17B | $0B | $526.74B |
| 2004 | $409.22B | $236.05B | $0B | $645.28B |
| 2005 | $417.32B | $368.23B | $0B | $785.55B |
| 2006 | $424.38B | $517.79B | $0B | $942.16B |
| 2007 | $431.74B | $725.38B | $0B | $1,157.12B |
| 2008 | $438.55B | $962.44B | $0B | $1,400.99B |
| 2009 | $446.12B | $1,160.85B | $0B | $1,606.97B |
| 2010 | $453.55B | $1,375.16B | $0B | $1,828.71B |
| 2011 | $461.06B | $1,574.45B | $0B | $2,035.5B |
| 2012 | $468.86B | $1,730.75B | $0B | $2,199.62B |
| 2013 | $476.58B | $1,840.52B | $0B | $2,317.1B |
| 2014 | $483.18B | $1,921.33B | $0B | $2,404.51B |
| 2015 | $491.17B | $1,991.65B | $0B | $2,482.82B |
| 2016 | $498.34B | $2,046.15B | $0B | $2,544.5B |
| 2017 | $504.85B | $2,109.13B | $0B | $2,613.98B |
| 2018 | $512.32B | $2,164.82B | $0B | $2,677.14B |
| 2019 | $520.23B | $2,226.91B | $0B | $2,747.15B |
| 2020 | $529.19B | $2,286.12B | $0B | $2,815.31B |
| 2021 | $536.73B | $2,334.99B | $0B | $2,871.72B |
| 2022 | $543.19B | $2,358.09B | $0B | $2,901.28B |
| 2023 | $550.03B | $2,382.28B | $0B | $2,932.31B |
| 2024 | $559.14B | $2,401.88B | $0B | $2,961.02B |
| 2025 | $564.28B | $2,401.88B | $0B | $2,966.16B |
| 2026 | $564.28B | $2,401.88B | $45.76B | $3,011.92B |
| Included component | Cutoff | Billions, 2025 dollars |
|---|---|---|
| Selected Israel, Egypt and Jordan aid | 1951–2025 | $564.28 |
| Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria military obligations | FY2001–FY2024 | $2,401.88 |
| Iran estimated military costs | October 16, 2026 | $45.76 |
| Combined selected costs | Mixed cutoffs above | $3,011.92 |
| Additional CENTCOM costs outside included wars | Not reconciled | Unknown — not zero |
The combined line is the sum of the three components, not an additional category. The total is calculated from unrounded values; displayed components can differ slightly because of rounding. Readers can expand Show the numbers to see each annual cumulative observation.
Where CENTCOM fits into the cumulative total
The military lines already cover operations conducted under CENTCOM, including Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan-related missions. A separate CENTCOM budget is not automatically an additional charge. The amount of additional CENTCOM spending outside the included records remains unknown; the chart therefore remains a selected-cost subtotal, not a complete CENTCOM-inclusive total.
For FY2024, the Section 1090 report records $6.032 billion in Iraq/Syria obligations, while the budget overview lists $5.4 billion for Operation Inherent Resolve in its actuals column. Both concern the same operation, but the figures do not reconcile. The Section 1090 report also includes $13.069 billion for Afghanistan-related Operation Enduring Sentinel support. Subtracting these obligations from the overview’s $20.0 billion CENTCOM grouping would produce a residual without proving that it represents distinct additional costs. Sources: Section 1090 table and footnotes and budget overview, Figure 2.4.
A valid expanded total requires annual CENTCOM obligations with matching account and operation coverage, less the amounts already included in the war and aid series. GAO has documented that CENTCOM headquarters costs have themselves relied on contingency funding, underscoring why even headquarters spending cannot simply be assumed separate. Source: GAO’s CENTCOM funding review.
What the search for a CENTCOM range established
GAO publishes annual CENTCOM and component-headquarters operating obligations for FY2008–FY2013, separating regular-budget funding from contingency funding. That is useful evidence for a limited headquarters account, but not a low–high estimate of the entire command’s additional costs. Treating the two funding categories as competing estimates would confuse different categories with uncertainty. Source: GAO-14-440, Appendix II, Tables 6–7.
CRS explains that most defense spending is not routinely broken down by location, and regional basing costs depend on what personnel, equipment and deployments are included. This review has not established matching annual records and an overlap adjustment sufficient to derive a comprehensive additional-CENTCOM range. Neither a numerical upper bound nor a positive additional lower bound is established here. Unknown is not zero. Adding a guessed band to the top chart would imply evidence that the available records do not supply. Source: CRS, overseas basing costs, pages 20–21.
How the calculation avoids overlap
For 1951–2000, the aid component uses the country-series obligations; no war-cost series is added for those years. From 2001 onward, it uses the funding-account data and excludes funds attributed to the Defense Department and the Army, Navy and Air Force. That removes about $2.002 billion in 2025 dollars from the three-country aid series. This deliberately broad exclusion prevents potentially overlapping defense-account assistance from being added to Pentagon war costs. It is not a finding that every excluded dollar was duplicated.
The remaining aid is funded outside those defense agencies. Funding-account totals reconcile to the country totals for each of the three recipients in every year from 2001 through 2025. A record is counted as an obligation once; disbursements, budget requests and arms-sale announcements are not added to it. Sources: country data and funding-account data.
The military component uses only the two annual Pentagon columns shown in the next war chart. It excludes Ukraine. The broader Costs of War lifetime estimates, the separate 2023–2025 regional estimate and the CRS historical aid totals are not added to this cumulative line. Their coverage overlaps other records or cannot be reconciled into this annual calculation.
The Iran addition is an estimate, not all money already paid
Stars and Stripes reported a $47.1 billion Pentagon estimate through October 16, 2026. It includes approximately $29 billion for munitions replacement and $6.1 billion for replacement equipment, which the report described as unfunded, alongside roughly $11.9 billion in incurred costs. Rounded parts do not exactly equal the headline total, so the calculation uses the reported total once. Source: Stars and Stripes, October 28.
We convert that $47.1 billion using the 2026-to-2025 factor in the government aid download, approximately 0.971511, giving $45.758 billion in 2025 dollars. The 2026 factor is provisional, not final full-year inflation. The estimate has a different accounting status from the historical obligations, which is why its contribution is displayed separately as well as in the combined line.
The chart does not add a new funding request, replacement-cost components or earlier Iran estimates on top of the $47.1 billion. It also does not estimate omitted base-repair costs. Annual data for Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War have not been verified for this calculation, so their historical totals remain outside this line. Recent reporting gaps, missing Egypt observations, 2025 Afghanistan/Iraq/Syria costs and 2026 aid also remain outside it. The result is a transparent subtotal of selected records, not a claimed comprehensive upper or lower estimate.
Scope of this accounting
The United States has committed hundreds of billions of dollars to Israel and its Arab peace partners, while the broader costs of American wars reach into the trillions. But a single price tag for “75 years of wars for Israel” would confuse who received the money, why it was approved and when the bill comes due.
A useful accounting separates three questions: how much Washington supplied directly to Israel; how much it provided to countries whose peace and cooperation help sustain regional security; and how much American military campaigns cost. Neoconservative advocacy belongs in the political history of those campaigns. It is not a federal spending category.
This review covers the roughly 75-year period from 1951 to 2026, using the available historical series. Some series start in 1946; the Korean War begins in 1950. Those exceptions are labeled. The charts preserve each source’s dollar basis and cutoff rather than inventing a uniform, up-to-the-minute total.
CENTCOM: regional operations are part of the bill
CENTCOM means U.S. Central Command. The Pentagon’s FY2026 budget overview reports $20.0 billion for FY2024 actuals, $16.7 billion enacted for FY2025 and $15.3 billion requested for FY2026 in its USCENTCOM operations grouping. These are different accounting stages, not three years of verified cash payments. Source: Pentagon budget overview, Figure 2.4, pages 2-12–2-13.
The grouping includes Operation Inherent Resolve and other theater requirements. Its footnote includes some missions outside CENTCOM, including the Horn of Africa and Guantanamo. The stated total excludes international border-security and coalition-support funding. It is not a complete inventory of the military’s regional costs or solely spending to defend Israel.
Source: Pentagon FY2026 overview, Figure 2.4, Official inflation-adjustment data, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Fiscal year and status | Inherent Resolve | Other theater and related missions |
|---|---|---|
| FY2024 actuals | $5.54B | $14.99B |
| FY2025 enacted | $5.4B | $11.3B |
| FY2026 request | $4.37B | $10.49B |
Why the CENTCOM bars are not added to the cumulative line
This is an overlapping view of military activity, not a new independent cost category. Inherent Resolve covers Iraq/Syria activity already represented in the annual war-cost series. “Other theater” is not automatically an extra amount either: support for those operations can fall within broader war accounting.
Removing only the Inherent Resolve segment would therefore not establish a clean, non-overlapping addition. Reconciling the rest requires matching fiscal years, funding accounts, obligations and the coverage of each war estimate. We have not established that reconciliation, so the $3.012 trillion selected-cost subtotal remains unchanged. This does not imply that all CENTCOM costs are already captured.
The bars use the same GDP-price adjustment as the other constant-dollar charts: approximately 1.026345 for 2024, 1 for 2025 and 0.971511 for 2026. Their adjusted totals are about $20.53 billion, $16.70 billion and $14.86 billion, respectively. The FY2026 request is not a final 2026 spending total and does not replace the separately dated Iran-war estimate. No 75-year CENTCOM series is extrapolated from these three observations.
Year by year: aid in constant 2025 dollars
The chart below uses the government’s annual reported obligations for Israel, Egypt and Jordan, rather than allocating a cumulative total across years. Every amount is expressed in 2025 purchasing power. ForeignAssistance.gov adjusts its constant-dollar series with the Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP chain price index. This download’s obligation series has 2025 as its base: its current and constant values match in that year. Sources: official country CSV and constant-dollar methodology.
Coverage matters: This is the ForeignAssistance.gov country series, not the broader CRS aid ledger shown later. For example, its Israel figure for FY2024 is $6.82 billion before inflation adjustment, while the CRS table includes additional missile-defense support. The series should not be described as all U.S. support for Israel.
The download was retrieved November 4, 2026 from a page marked updated October 30, 2026. Recent observations remain subject to reporting gaps and revisions. Egypt’s FY2024 and FY2025 reported obligations are especially low compared with its appropriated aid; those points do not establish that aid ended. FY2026 is omitted because a completed fiscal year does not ensure complete reporting.
Source: ForeignAssistance.gov country CSV, GDP price-index methodology, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Fiscal year | Israel | Egypt | Jordan |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1951 | $1M | $1M | $1M |
| 1952 | $841.5M | $11.7M | $49.7M |
| 1953 | $704M | $123.4M | $27.7M |
| 1954 | $706.1M | $37.8M | $121.9M |
| 1955 | $494.5M | $622.2M | $83.5M |
| 1956 | $464.8M | $304.7M | $74.1M |
| 1957 | $360.6M | $8.8M | $194.9M |
| 1958 | $523.8M | $5.1M | $421M |
| 1959 | $424M | $377.7M | $533.8M |
| 1960 | $463.2M | $548M | $477.8M |
| 1961 | $394.6M | $603M | $589.7M |
| 1962 | $681.4M | $1,628.3M | $399.5M |
| 1963 | $615.5M | $1,177.3M | $488.7M |
| 1964 | $293.4M | $757.4M | $434.2M |
| 1965 | $481M | $760.9M | $404.5M |
| 1966 | $967.4M | $210.6M | $518.6M |
| 1967 | $97M | $93.3M | $443.6M |
| 1968 | $549.4M | – | $138.6M |
| 1969 | $832.7M | – | $176.4M |
| 1970 | $461.9M | – | $26.7M |
| 1971 | $3,713.4M | – | $465.9M |
| 1972 | $2,384.8M | $8.8M | $681.7M |
| 1973 | $2,317.8M | $4.5M | $714M |
| 1974 | $13,379.6M | $112.5M | $587M |
| 1975 | $3,124.8M | $1,770.8M | $954.8M |
| 1976 | $10,800.1M | $2,076.9M | $879.9M |
| 1976 TQ | $1,210M | $2,399.6M | $376.1M |
| 1977 | $7,266.4M | $3,786.5M | $881.1M |
| 1978 | $7,003.8M | $3,686.8M | $899M |
| 1979 | $17,322.5M | $9,360.7M | $763.8M |
| 1980 | $5,940.5M | $3,882.6M | $505.2M |
| 1981 | $6,555.2M | $5,092.6M | $165.3M |
| 1982 | $6,248.1M | $5,571.9M | $205M |
| 1983 | $6,744.2M | $6,328.5M | $197.9M |
| 1984 | $6,838M | $6,472.8M | $358.3M |
| 1985 | $8,493M | $6,257.9M | $486.3M |
| 1986 | $8,978.1M | $6,295.4M | $442.2M |
| 1987 | $7,275.6M | $5,618.9M | $274.1M |
| 1988 | $7,047M | $5,108.9M | $121.8M |
| 1989 | $6,773.4M | $5,124.5M | $63M |
| 1990 | $6,665.2M | $5,204.4M | $250.3M |
| 1991 | $7,764.7M | $4,836.6M | $192.9M |
| 1992 | $6,309.5M | $4,585.2M | $102.5M |
| 1993 | $6,636.3M | $4,121.3M | $201.7M |
| 1994 | $5,892.4M | $3,828.3M | $118.4M |
| 1995 | $5,782.6M | $4,453.2M | $90.7M |
| 1996 | $5,925.4M | $4,142.1M | $430.9M |
| 1997 | $5,887.6M | $3,927.1M | $415.6M |
| 1998 | $5,644.2M | $3,909.5M | $291.3M |
| 1999 | $5,459.9M | $4,001.5M | $690.2M |
| 2000 | $6,850M | $3,676M | $793.8M |
| 2001 | $4,938.4M | $2,927.3M | $446.9M |
| 2002 | $4,743M | $3,995.3M | $596.9M |
| 2003 | $6,270.9M | $3,255.2M | $2,857.4M |
| 2004 | $4,442.7M | $3,322.9M | $1,031.2M |
| 2005 | $4,309.5M | $2,832.4M | $1,023.9M |
| 2006 | $3,905.5M | $2,532.2M | $648M |
| 2007 | $3,754.5M | $3,045.6M | $595.6M |
| 2008 | $3,551.2M | $2,351M | $919.8M |
| 2009 | $3,522.5M | $2,877.3M | $1,197.7M |
| 2010 | $4,086.6M | $2,297.7M | $1,096.5M |
| 2011 | $4,277.1M | $2,165.6M | $1,115.5M |
| 2012 | $4,403.6M | $1,921.9M | $1,619.7M |
| 2013 | $4,074.7M | $2,129.3M | $1,643.6M |
| 2014 | $4,299.4M | $1,001.2M | $1,508.7M |
| 2015 | $4,155.2M | $2,013.7M | $1,990.6M |
| 2016 | $4,100.1M | $1,678.8M | $1,564.9M |
| 2017 | $4,112.7M | $478.2M | $1,965.2M |
| 2018 | $3,932.2M | $1,569.8M | $2,113.1M |
| 2019 | $4,101.5M | $1,830M | $2,141.5M |
| 2020 | $4,055.2M | $1,833.5M | $3,164.6M |
| 2021 | $3,920.1M | $1,762.1M | $1,898.6M |
| 2022 | $3,657.1M | $1,507.6M | $1,335.6M |
| 2023 | $3,482.6M | $1,620.1M | $1,775.6M |
| 2024 | $6,999.4M | $248.9M | $1,870.9M |
| 2025 | $3,304.8M | $223.4M | $1,618.5M |
In this reported series, Israel and Egypt both peak in FY1979: about $17.32 billion and $9.36 billion, respectively, in 2025 dollars. Jordan peaks in FY2020 at about $3.16 billion. These are calculations from the downloaded annual data, not estimates of the share attributable to peace with Israel. Rounding in the displayed chart can hide small amounts; a missing observation is marked with a dash.
“1976 TQ” records the July–September transition between the old and new federal fiscal calendars. It is retained as its own labeled observation so it is neither lost nor mistaken for a second full fiscal year. Source: government data dictionary.
Israel: about $175 billion in the CRS historical ledger
The Congressional Research Service’s May 28, 2025 report lists $174.965 billion in aid obligations to Israel for 1946–2025, in dollars of the years recorded. Its components are approximately $124.506 billion in military assistance, $34.348 billion in economic assistance and $16.111 billion in missile-defense support. These are obligations, not a verified ledger of cash disbursed through November 2026. Source: CRS, Table 1.
Source: CRS, May 28, 2025, Table 1, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Aid category | Obligations |
|---|---|
| Military assistance | $124.51B |
| Economic assistance | $34.35B |
| Missile defense | $16.11B |
The same report gives a separate inflation-adjusted estimate of about $298 billion for 1946–2024, expressed in 2024 dollars. That is not a “high estimate” of the $175 billion figure: both the price basis and endpoint differ. Presenting the two as an uncertainty range would make inflation look like disagreement about how much aid was supplied.
A reader should also distinguish an aid commitment from a purchase. Money appropriated for assistance, a contract financed with that aid, and delivery of the resulting weapon can describe stages of the same transaction. Adding all three would count the same federal support more than once. This is especially important when public debate mixes annual aid announcements with large arms-sale headlines.
The political debate surrounding this spending is explored in our coverage of American attitudes toward Israel. This article addresses the fiscal record; it does not infer public support from the size of a budget.
Egypt and Jordan belong in the picture, with qualifications
Egypt is the clearest example of aid explicitly linked to peace with Israel. The 1979 U.S. law supporting the treaty authorized military procurement assistance for both countries and economic assistance for Egypt. Congress described economic stability and support for the peace process as purposes of that assistance. Source: 22 U.S.C. §3401.
CRS reported in February 2026 that Egypt had received over $90 billion in bilateral aid since 1946, in historical dollars. It described military cooperation and sustaining the 1979 treaty as central justifications. It also identified U.S. access through the Suez Canal as a practical American interest. Source: CRS, Egypt report.
This supports including Egypt in the cost of the regional peace framework. It does not establish that every dollar was a payment to prevent an Egyptian invasion. Aid can support several objectives at once. A careful accounting should preserve that distinction without concealing the treaty connection.
Jordan’s October 2026 CRS report lists approximately $35.5 billion in foreign assistance from FY1951 through FY2026, plus $2.8 billion through separate defense accounts since FY2015. Its 1994 peace treaty with Israel is part of the relationship. Refugee pressures, water needs, counterterrorism and cooperation with American forces are also part of the explanation. Source: CRS, Jordan report, foreign assistance section.
Source: CRS: Israel, CRS: Egypt, CRS: Jordan, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Recipient and scope | Reported amount |
|---|---|
| Israel | $174.97B |
| Egypt — over this amount | $90B |
| Jordan — foreign assistance | $35.5B |
| Jordan — additional defense accounts | $2.8B |
The Jordan bars are separate components, not competing low and high estimates. Combining them gives approximately $38.3 billion under the report’s stated scope. Egypt’s open-ended “over $90 billion” cannot honestly be converted into a precise upper bound.
Nor should every country in the region be added under the same heading. An arms sale paid for by a foreign government is not automatically American aid. A security relationship is not proof that Washington pays the partner to avoid war with Israel. This review does not assign fabricated “Israel-related” percentages to aid for other countries where a defensible allocation has not been established.
A documented low–high range for recent regional costs
For the period October 2023 through September 2025, economist Linda Bilmes estimated U.S. military activities in the wider Middle East at $9.65 billion to $12.07 billion. Her report combined that range with a companion estimate of $21.7 billion in military aid to Israel, producing $31.35 billion to $33.77 billion. Source: Costs of War, October 7, 2025, Table 1.
Source: Linda Bilmes, Costs of War, Table 1, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
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| Scope | Low estimate | High estimate |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. regional operations | $9.65B | $12.07B |
| Operations plus Israel military aid | $31.35B | $33.77B |
The regional estimate includes operations serving American, Israeli and other allied interests. It is not a claim that every operation had one beneficiary. The published range reflects uncertainty in estimating costs; it does not quantify uncertainty about political motives.
These recent figures also overlap the historical aid record. They belong beside it as a closer look at one period, not underneath it as an extra charge. The distinction matters when readers assess the costs of the policies discussed in our timeline of Israeli warnings about Iran’s nuclear program.
Year by year: reported military costs in 2025 dollars
The Pentagon’s February 2025 Section 1090 report provides annual war-related obligations for FY2001–FY2024. The chart below takes its Afghanistan-related and Iraq/Syria columns and converts each year to 2025 dollars. Syria enters the report’s Iraq/Syria category in 2014; earlier observations cover Iraq. Afghanistan-related costs continue after the withdrawal, including over-the-horizon counterterrorism support. Source: Section 1090 report and annual table.
To use the same price basis as the aid chart, we multiply each nominal annual amount by that year’s constant-to-current-dollar ratio in the ForeignAssistance.gov obligation data. Those ratios are consistent across recipient countries, apart from rounding, and equal one in 2025. This is our GDP-price-index conversion of Pentagon figures, not a Pentagon-published inflation-adjusted series or a measure of military-specific equipment prices.
Source: Pentagon, February 2025, FY2001–FY2024 table, ForeignAssistance.gov annual GDP price-adjustment factors, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Fiscal year | Afghanistan-related | Iraq and Syria |
|---|---|---|
| 2001 | $0.8B | $0B |
| 2002 | $33.95B | $0B |
| 2003 | $20.6B | $70.83B |
| 2004 | $16.72B | $93.16B |
| 2005 | $18.32B | $113.86B |
| 2006 | $21.74B | $127.82B |
| 2007 | $30.04B | $177.55B |
| 2008 | $46.68B | $190.39B |
| 2009 | $68.34B | $130.07B |
| 2010 | $110.39B | $103.93B |
| 2011 | $135.74B | $63.54B |
| 2012 | $134.62B | $21.69B |
| 2013 | $105.31B | $4.46B |
| 2014 | $79.24B | $1.58B |
| 2015 | $61.49B | $8.83B |
| 2016 | $49.48B | $5.03B |
| 2017 | $52.22B | $10.75B |
| 2018 | $45.3B | $10.4B |
| 2019 | $47.55B | $14.54B |
| 2020 | $48.37B | $10.84B |
| 2021 | $40.17B | $8.7B |
| 2022 | $15.59B | $7.52B |
| 2023 | $18.88B | $5.3B |
| 2024 | $13.41B | $6.19B |
The combined military series reaches about $237.06 billion in FY2008, in 2025 dollars. Its two largest individual annual observations are Iraq in FY2008, about $190.39 billion, and Afghanistan-related spending in FY2011, about $135.74 billion. These peaks are calculated from the report’s rounded nominal figures.
This series is narrower than the Costs of War estimates below. It does not turn the broader $8 trillion estimate into an annual spending history, and it must not be added to that estimate. The source also excludes non-Defense Department classified programs. No verified annual allocation has been supplied here for the earlier Korean, Vietnam and Gulf War totals or future veterans’ obligations. The cumulative chart above adds a separately dated, partial-year Iran estimate; this annual Afghanistan/Iraq/Syria chart does not. Those remain separate, dated estimates rather than invented annual points.
The post-9/11 bill: lower and higher accounting scopes
The Costs of War project’s 2021 study estimated $5.843 trillion in war-related appropriations and costs through FY2022, including requests for that fiscal year. Adding $2.2 trillion in projected veterans’ care for 2023–2050 raised the estimate to $8.043 trillion. The broader calculation includes homeland security, interest and war-related increases in the regular defense budget. Source: Neta Crawford, September 2021, Table 1.
Source: Costs of War, September 2021, Table 1, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
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| Accounting scope | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Through FY2022 scope | $5.84T |
| Including future veterans care | $8.04T |
The higher bar does not mean the full amount had already left the Treasury. The lower bar does not mean future obligations disappear. The difference concerns when costs arrive and which accounts belong in the assessment.
This is why a narrow operational figure and a broader lifetime estimate can both be useful. The first helps explain the budget required to conduct a campaign. The second helps assess the financial consequences of choosing it. Neither can substitute for the other without changing the question.
Calling the entire post-9/11 estimate aid to Israel would be a category error. It measures American activities and obligations across a much wider security effort. The same caution applies to describing every dollar as the result of one ideological movement.
Iraq: the strongest documented neoconservative connection
The National Archives’ Clinton Library collection documents the Project for the New American Century’s January 1998 appeal for an official policy of regime change in Iraq. PNAC was founded in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. That is direct evidence of organized advocacy before the 2003 invasion. Source: Clinton Presidential Library, PNAC records.
It does not settle the full causal history of the war. Historian Joseph Stieb’s review describes a scholarly debate over security fears, American primacy and the influence of neoconservatives. Evidence that a group urged a policy is different from evidence that it alone caused the government to adopt it. Source: Texas National Security Review.
A March 2023 Costs of War study estimated Iraq-and-Syria costs to that point at $1.79 trillion. Including projected veterans’ care through 2050 brought its estimate to $2.89 trillion. The scope extends beyond the initial invasion and occupation to later operations in Iraq and Syria. Source: Costs of War, “Blood and Treasure”.
Source: Costs of War, March 2023, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Accounting scope | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Costs to the 2023 study | $1.79T |
| Including future veterans care | $2.89T |
This provides a defensible lower-and-higher comparison for an intervention strongly associated with neoconservative advocacy. It does not provide a financial invoice attributable exclusively to PNAC, to Israel or to the original invasion decision. Subsequent campaigns had additional decisions, participants and objectives.
Our coverage of the Vance–Trump dispute over Israel and Iran addresses the current political argument. Historical cost accounting should remain distinct from claims made by any side of that dispute.
Earlier wars provide context, not a neoconservative subtotal
Neoconservatism did not exist as a single governing program across the whole period. Historian Justin Vaïsse describes its beginnings among domestic-policy intellectuals in the 1960s and a later foreign-policy phase. Labeling the Korean War a neoconservative project would impose a later political category on an earlier conflict. Source: Brookings.
CRS’s historical war-cost report offers useful context for Korea, Vietnam and the 1990–1991 Gulf War. It measures military costs rather than the broader lifetime approach used above. The following chart retains its FY2011 price basis. Source: CRS, June 29, 2010.
Source: CRS, Costs of Major U.S. Wars, Table 1, Taxpayer denominator: Pentagon Section 1090 report
Show the numbers
| Conflict | Military cost |
|---|---|
| Korea 1950–1953 | $341B |
| Vietnam 1965–1975 | $738B |
| Persian Gulf 1990–1991 | $102B |
The Gulf War illustrates another trap. CRS gives its gross cost as $61 billion in then-current dollars, but says allied contributions and costs absorbed by the Defense Department left a net U.S. taxpayer cost of $4.7 billion. Gross military cost and net taxpayer cost answer different questions. Neither should be quietly substituted for the other.
The newest war bill remains incomplete
The Associated Press reported on October 28, 2026 that a Pentagon estimate placed Iran-war costs at $47.1 billion through October 16. It excluded damage to U.S. bases. That is an interim estimate with a defined cutoff, not a settled lifetime bill or an upper bound. Source: AP’s report on the Pentagon estimate.
An earlier estimate and a later estimate should not automatically become a low–high range: they may cover different amounts of fighting. A request for future funding is also not proof that the requested amount has been spent. Without a documented upper estimate using the same scope, this review leaves the upper bound unknown.
What the competing accounting approaches reveal
Advocates of the regional aid framework point to its intended security benefits. The 1979 statute explicitly treats support for peace as an American national interest. On that view, aid deserves evaluation alongside the costs and risks of renewed conflict, rather than only as a transfer abroad.
A broader fiscal assessment asks who will pay after combat ends. The Costs of War approach keeps veterans’ care and borrowing costs in view. That approach is useful for judging long-term commitments, but it requires clear separation of actual spending, budget authority and projections.
A conservative critique of loose cost comparisons reaches a related conclusion from another direction. In a Heritage Foundation essay, retired Maj. Gen. John Ferrari argues that cost estimates depend on timelines, indirect costs and what resources would have been needed without a war. Transparent definitions are essential to judging what taxpayers receive. Source: Heritage, October 18, 2022.
Those approaches need not produce the same preferred policy. They should still agree on basic arithmetic: do not add a subtotal to the total that contains it; do not call inflation adjustment a high estimate; and do not portray every regional aid dollar as money sent to Israel.
For readers weighing the policy choices, our guide to polling on foreign wars addresses a separate question: what Americans support. The cost evidence here establishes the scale of commitments, not whether those commitments were worth making.
Methodology: Sources were reviewed November 4, 2026. The cumulative selected-cost chart, two annual charts and CENTCOM comparison use constant 2025 dollars; the six historical comparison charts retain their separately labeled original dollar bases. Annual aid figures use reported obligations only, with no requests or disbursements mixed in. Annual military figures are converted with the same GDP-price adjustment factors. Annual source data do not provide low–high uncertainty bounds, so none have been invented. Charts reproduce published amounts or explicitly labeled sums, retaining original dates and dollar bases. The regional low–high range is a published estimate; the post-9/11 and Iraq comparisons show different accounting scopes. No verified low–high interval exists here for a comprehensive 75-year total. Egypt and Jordan are included because of documented peace and security ties, without attributing all their aid to Israel. Human losses, recipient-country costs and household energy-price effects are outside this federal-budget comparison.
Per-taxpayer calculation
Each displayed amount is divided by 216,559,400, the FY2024 taxpayer count used in the Pentagon’s February 2025 Section 1090 report. Its definition counts a joint individual-income-tax return as two taxpayers and single, married-filing-separately and head-of-household returns as one each. It is not a count of households, people owing positive income tax, or everyone paying payroll, sales or other taxes. We use the same denominator across all years and charts rather than imply that a decades-long cost was paid by that year’s filers. Source: Section 1090 report, footnote 2.
The chart notes show every category for bar and column charts, the cumulative endpoints for the two cumulative charts, and the latest observations plus the largest combined reported year for annual charts. These amounts preserve the chart’s price basis: constant 2025 dollars, nominal historical dollars or constant FY2011 dollars as labeled. They do not convert nominal charts into inflation-adjusted charts. Actual taxes are distributed unevenly, and borrowing also finances federal spending. Values are rounded to the nearest dollar; small positive amounts may round to zero.
Differing perspectives
How should the costs of U.S. regional aid and military intervention be assessed?
Each position is summarized as its supporters make it, with equal weight and in alphabetical order. A summary is not an endorsement; the evidence for each is weighed in the story above.
Evaluate aid alongside peace and security benefits
Who holds it: Congress’s stated policy in the 1979 treaty-support law
The statutory rationale treats support for the Egypt–Israel treaty as serving American national interests. It connects security assistance and Egyptian economic development with sustaining peace. This approach evaluates the expenditure alongside diplomatic and security goals, rather than treating a transfer to an ally as sufficient evidence that the policy lacks value.
In their words: U.S. Code, 22 U.S.C. §3401 ↗
Include long-term obligations in war costs
Who holds it: Neta Crawford and the Costs of War project
The project argues for an accounting that includes costs outside the Pentagon’s immediate operational budget. Veterans’ care, borrowing costs and related security expenditures matter when judging the financial consequences of war. This approach separates future obligations from earlier costs while bringing both into the discussion of the commitments a military campaign creates.
In their words: Costs of War, September 2021 ↗
Specify scope before comparing estimates
Who holds it: John G. Ferrari, writing for the Heritage Foundation
Ferrari argues that defense-cost comparisons require clear timelines and definitions. Analysts need to explain whether figures include indirect costs, future care and resources that would be maintained even without a war. This approach emphasizes transparency about what each estimate purchases or measures so that policymakers can assess defense capabilities and taxpayer costs.
In their words: Heritage Foundation ↗
READ BEYOND 567POLITICS
Alternate sources & perspectives
Independent coverage and primary evidence to help you compare arguments. A link is not an endorsement; perspective labels describe the linked material.
- primary evidence
Aid by funding agency and account: overlap screen ↗
U.S. Department of State / ForeignAssistance.gov
Funding-account obligations reconcile to the three-country annual totals for 2001–2025. The cumulative chart excludes Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force funding rather than assuming these amounts are independent of war costs.
- independent analysis
Iran estimate includes unfunded replacement costs ↗
Stars and Stripes / Svetlana Shkolnikova
October 28 report of the Pentagon estimate through October 16 distinguishes incurred operational costs from unfunded munitions and equipment replacement. Article uses the $47.1 billion total once and applies a provisional 2026 price factor.
- primary evidence
Annual reported aid obligations and constant-dollar values ↗
U.S. Department of State / ForeignAssistance.gov
Downloaded November 4, 2026; website marked updated October 30. Obligations only, 1951–2025 plus 1976 transition quarter. Recent records can be incomplete and scope differs from CRS.
- primary evidence
How ForeignAssistance.gov adjusts for inflation ↗
U.S. Department of State / ForeignAssistance.gov
Constant Dollar Amount entry specifies the BEA GDP chain price index. The downloaded obligations series is based in 2025.
- primary evidence
Annual military obligations, FY2001–FY2024 ↗
Department of Defense Comptroller
February 2025 Section 1090 report. Article converts Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria columns to 2025 dollars; excludes Ukraine and does not treat narrow military costs as lifetime costs.
- primary evidence
U.S. aid to Israel: historical obligations and dollar bases ↗
Congressional Research Service
May 2025 report; Table 1 covers 1946–2025 nominal obligations. Inflation-adjusted estimate has a different endpoint.
- primary evidence
Egypt: aid and the treaty relationship ↗
Congressional Research Service, republished by EveryCRSReport
February 2026 report describes over $90 billion in historical bilateral aid and multiple strategic purposes.
- primary evidence
Jordan: bilateral and additional defense assistance ↗
Congressional Research Service, republished by EveryCRSReport
October 2026 report distinguishes $35.5 billion in foreign assistance from $2.8 billion in additional defense-account aid.
- other perspective
Congress’s rationale for supporting the Egypt–Israel treaty ↗
U.S. Government Publishing Office
The statute states the American peace and development rationale for aid; it does not attribute all later assistance to one purpose.
- independent analysis
Regional military costs: published low–high estimates ↗
Brown University Costs of War / Linda Bilmes
Original 2025 research supplies the $9.65–$12.07 billion operational range and combined aid-plus-operations range.
- independent analysis
Post-9/11 costs and future veterans’ obligations ↗
Brown University Costs of War / Neta Crawford
2021 estimate including FY2022 requests and projected care through 2050; not an audited 2026 outlay ledger.
- right argument
Defense-cost definitions and the problem of mismatched estimates ↗
Heritage Foundation / John G. Ferrari
Original conservative analysis argues for transparent scope, timelines and treatment of indirect costs.
Reviewed 2026-11-04. Reviewed original CRS reports, federal treaty-support law, National Archives history and original research. The connector's discovery search returned unrelated United Airlines results; those were excluded and sources were independently located and opened. Published estimation ranges are distinguished from changes in accounting scope. Historical series have different cutoffs; no complete 1951–2026 total or defensible upper bound for all regional aid was found. This is budget research, not a social-media sentiment sample or an attribution of all regional aid to Israel. Annual-chart update: downloaded official files through their public download links after command-line access failed. Verified 75 fiscal-year observations plus the 1976 transition quarter, preserving missing Egypt records, and 24 annual military observations. Discovery search again returned irrelevant results (Microsoft), which were excluded. No annual low–high uncertainty bands or complete 75-year war-cost series were found. The six older comparison charts retain their stated price bases. Cumulative update: reviewed funding-agency records and original Stars and Stripes reporting. Removed all defense-funded aid from 2001 onward as a conservative overlap screen; excluded broad lifetime totals, regional subtotals, future care and interest. Iran is included as estimated costs, including unfunded replacement, not audited cash spending. Its 2026-to-2025 inflation factor is provisional. Earlier wars and unverified recent costs remain excluded. Reconciled funding-account sums to country totals for all 75 country-year pairs in 2001–2025.